Adam Smith on Militias, Standing Armies, and National Defense

This essay was lightly edited for content on August 27th, 2024.

Adam Smith believed that Britain’s defense of offshore colonies was an unfit project benefitting a subset of society at the expense of the whole (“Of Colonies,” The Wealth of Nations, Vol. II, Chapter VII, Liberty Fund Edition, 1981). In his chapter on defense, Smith does not address affluent nations seeking hegemony or a balance of power. Rather, he limits his warnings to advanced “civilized” nations defending liberty and prosperity from those wishing to attack it militarily (” Of the Expence of Defence,” The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter I).

Smith emphasizes three points. The first duty of the sovereign is that of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies, and this can be performed only by means of a military (1). Secondly, an industrious prosperous nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked (15). Finally, the duty of defending a society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows gradually more and more expensive, as a society advances (42).

Writing in 1776, Smith focused on the need for military preparedness in an advanced societies with a large population and division of labor. He does not present a once-and-for-all model of defense but relies on his understanding of cultural anthropology and astute reading of history. His observations remain relevant.

Smith notes that among nations of nomadic shepherds, every man is a warrior; there is no state expense in preparing him. These warriors seek to conquer but if vanquished, all is lost; not merely their herds, but their women and children become the booty of the conqueror (3). Defending against such nomadic nations presents more of a challenge as compared with smaller hunter societies seldomly posing a formidable threat to nearby settled societies (5).

Agricultural communities, unlike hunter or nomadic societies, are characterized by fixed residences in which hardy men of military age, between seeding and harvest, may be willing to serve at little state expense in short campaigns (7). On the other hand, in highly specialized commercial societies a great part of the active military must be drawn from manufacturing and trade. In these nations, the military must be fully compensated by the public because the sole source of personal income for those in active duty is dried up in their absence (9).

In advanced nations, war becomes an intricate and “complicated science” with long campaigns. Therefore, soldiers must be maintained by the labor of those who are not soldiers. The economic reality, Smith points out, is that military expenses cannot exceed that which non-soldiers produce to maintain civilians' standard of living and, in addition, fulfill their obligations in supporting soldiers, government officials, and an essential judicial system.

In ancient times, the preparation of soldiers was not wholly dependent on tax revenue. In Greece, military fitness was part of general education and imposed by the state. In feudal times, public ordinances required training in archery and other military exercises. Therefore, Smith says, “The experience of preparing an army for the field seems not to have become considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth (12).” From history, Smith observed that, even when national survival was at stake and dependent on a military financed as a distinct separate profession, some states refused to do so (14).

According to Smith, there are “but two methods, by which the state can make any tolerable provision for the publick defence (16).” First, the state can enforce military exercises and oblige a certain number of military age to participate in a part-time militia. Or, the state can choose to maintain a certain number of citizens constantly prepared for active duty as a separate and distinct profession (17-18).

Smith strongly advocates for the latter method: “…the history of all ages, it will be found, bears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well-regulated standing army has over a militia (28).” Advanced weaponry requires more than strength and agility, and soldiers who practice once a week do not gain expertise. Furthermore, order and obedience are more important qualities in battle than skill in the use of arms. Smith maintains that weekend warriors can never maintain the same obedience to military officers, as those whose whole life and conduct are every day directed by them.

Although Smith advocates for a standing army, he does not present it as the ultimate answer. He claims that the militias of Greece, Syria, and Egypt were incapable of resisting the standing armies of Rome. However, Roman standing armies gradually degenerated into corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined units, incapable of resisting attack. German and Scythian militias of husbandmen took to the field under chieftains whom they were accustomed to obey in peace. Soldiers, according to Smith, appear to never lose their valor, but “In a long peace the generals, perhaps, may sometimes forget their skill… (38).” Smith’s point is that historically advanced nations can succumb to a less advanced society with a superior militia. Nevertheless, he insists, “A well-regulated standing army is superior to every militia (39).”

Historical analogies are often worse than useless. If we accept Smith’s assumption that a civilized nation can only be perpetuated and maintained over time by a well-regulated standing army, he must at a minimum state what he means by well-regulated.

Smith’s first condition is that the intentions of army officers be properly aligned with that of the sovereign [head of state] and, secondly, that the sovereign and chief military officers together work in the interests of the nation. His recommendation for achieving this is to bestow overall military authority on the sovereign and military command under the direction of officers whose greatest interest is supporting civil authority. He views “chief officers” as being drawn from a natural aristocracy (41).”

A footnote to Smith's chapter on defense refers to his lectures on jurisprudence. There, he maintains that a standing army was less of a threat in Britain than elsewhere given that a system of liberty had been established before its introduction (40). The threat refers to a potential for internal discord and an army misaligned with the sovereign. His concern is with “that troublesome jealousy, which in some modern rebuplicks, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.” He adds, “That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army (41).”

The invention of superior artillery, according to Smith, increases the costs of defending society from the violence and injustice of other independent societies and that these increased expenses must be maintained in times of war, “…and afterwards even in time of peace (42).” He concludes that only prosperous nations can afford the advanced military technology “which at first sight appear to be so pernicious, [but] is certainly favourable both to the permanency and to the extension of civilization (44).”