Where Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill Shake Hands

In classical liberal theory, two authors are often highlighted in the referential tree: Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Due to the century-long gap that separates them, Mill seems to be a positive successor to Smith’s own thesis, especially in regards to the rejection of despotism and the defense of individual liberty, which in turn places them as heirs to John Locke. But do Smith and Mill stand side-by-side when it comes to a theory of ethics and the foundations of society? This matter is held up for debate, given that both authors contain major differences as well as similarities.

Among the most relevant contrasts between these authors, the dichotomy between Smith’s rationalist worldview and Mill’s utilitarianism seems the most prominent one. One may argue, over the course of time, that the latter is an empiricist evolution of the former. Smith was not a utilitarian, as he openly disavowed many theses espoused by the latter school of thought. On the other hand, even if Mill would become a major utilitarian through his ideas, he maintained a belief in Smith’s overall theory of economics while professing a continuation of his work. The passing of time allowed for utilitarian thinking to assimilate most of Smith’s contributions into its own discourse, although differing viewpoints appear when examining the subjects upfront. 

In his treatise On Liberty, Mill argues that it is natural for individuals in an open society to make certain decisions based on sentiments rather than reason. In general, sentiments are the guiding compass in the confection of political interests, as well as issues like social resentment, class differences, and the various complexities of political economy. As if he were predicting Mill’s contribution, Adam Smith himself wrote the following:

Rather than make a point on ethics or anthropology, this statement explains the logic behind revolutionary thinking, as observed during the 19th century through the many onsets against absolute monarchies. Not only did this bold premise disprove the rationalist model that had prevailed during the Enlightenment age, but at the same time it exerted a radically altruistic notion of anthropology and ethics by attributing morality to men’s feelings rather than logic. In 1759, one century before Mill’s book was published, Adam Smith made a case similar to his own on the grounds of rational self-interest by publishing The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In Smith’s contribution, well-being and individualism adopted an intrinsically rational justification rather than a utilitarian cause. Furthermore, he held a more traditional understanding of society and the state than Mill and other classical liberals would develop a hundred years later. Due to this, many will find it challenging to separate fundamental liberal notions from some of Smith’s ideas concerning the state.

However, on the grounds where Smith and Mill share important similarities, one need only look at the parallels found in the aforementioned books.

While commenting on the nature of what affects people, Mill discerns between the individual and others, acknowledging that what affects one may, in turn, influence others through him. Whether this turns out to be positive or negative will be determined by others. Mill stresses that this contingency entails “the appropriate region of human liberty” (On Liberty, Chapter I), effectively separating the individualist mindset from the philosophical tradition that had preceded it. Naturally, the framework for this premise is the utilitarian good that liberty permits, in terms of convenience and propriety. Precisely because of this, liberty appeals to individuals. Further on, Mill establishes the role that moral sentiments partake in the overall composition of a free society:

As part of Mill’s discourse, certain decisions that impel individuals to collaborate in society are not based on rationality, but on sentiment. This benign anthropological substrate seems to agree with Rousseau’s essential basis for the theory of the social contract, as well as with Smith’s own Theory of Social Sentiments. What follows from this philosophical intuition that allows humans to trust each other enough to coalesce in a society should result, through force of habit, in a new morality. In turn, morality becomes the rule of law, and so on.

An even more compelling statement is offered later:

The problems with how custom evolves into legislation, according to Mill, arise from the effort exerted by parties seeking to expand the power of society over the individual. On similar grounds, Smith judges the individual to be permanently in danger of coercion from the state, even if he concedes that the state must have an elemental participation in things.

Among the feelings that also partake in the sum of individual wills, are those longing for an increase in authority. While these were not so prevalent in England, Mill stresses that, nonetheless, they embodied a cause seeking to change society as a whole. Thus, as with the essentials of society’s development, moral sentiments shape the outcome of the social pact and may determine their mutation towards freedom or authoritarianism.

People decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control (On Liberty, Chapter I).

As with most matters in political philosophy seen from the liberal tradition, the divide in the scheme of moral sentiments lies in the acquiescence to government control. Ultimately, however, this issue is to be determined within the frameworks of liberty rather than in the vein of a despotic authority. This is why Mill claims that these ideas retain a universal truism regardless of the form of government or nation that strives to understand liberty, and it would be safe to concede that Smith would shake his hand in agreement.

More by this author:
The Liberal Roots of Karl Marx and How He Went Wrong
Adam Smith and the Counter-Enlightenment

Related works:
GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter? A generative book by Tyler Cowen. Online only. Also available at GOAT: Who is the Greatest Economist of all Time and Why Does it Matter? (Summarized by Joy Buchanan here)
De-Xing Guan's Adam Smith on Cost and Utility
Philip D. Bunn's Seeing Beauty in Utility with Adam Smith
Essays on Adam Smith & Moral Philosophy