Hostile factions and political instability
"The problem of faction seems to be when they undermine the systems of which they are a part, and this relates to the concern which Ryan has rightly identified that Smith has with the stability of institutions over time and of public life more generally."
This is an edited transcript of a talk that Shal Marriot gave in response to "Adam Smith's 'Coarse Clay' Political Realism" a talk by Ryan Griffiths at the Research Group on Constitutional Studies Lecture Series at McGill University. You can find a video of the talk here.
I want to start by thanking Ryan [Griffiths] for his presentation and to offer my warmest congratulations to Dr. Griffiths for the successful defense of his dissertation.
I want to start by thanking Ryan [Griffiths] for his presentation and to offer my warmest congratulations to Dr. Griffiths for the successful defense of his dissertation.
Ryan has led us through an exploration of Adam Smith as a political scientist. In his persuasive and original argument, Ryan begins by setting a foundation of Smith's corpus as one which is complete in the theory it sought to explore regarding political matters, and which stays true to the facts that we encounter in our everyday, ordinary political lives—or the political life of the 18th century, as the case may be. In doing so, Ryan claims that Smith develops an intrinsically realist perspective. This realist perspective draws out the deeply descriptive nature of Smith’s project. The Smith scholar Fonna Forman notes how Smith emphasizes matters of fact rather than matters of right.
One of the essential facts of politics, which Ryan draws our attention to, is the admiration of the rich and powerful, which can corrupt our moral sentiments. One of the dangers of politics is that it makes us worse people, and this identifies the moral stakes involved in political questions. For Smith, there's a substantive connection between our desire to do good and how practical that is in a political world.
However, there's an even more pernicious source of our corruption. One, which we also find in Smith, which is also an inevitable fact about politics, and which will be the subject of my remarks today: factions.
Factions, as groups that form within the community, are an inevitable part of being inspired by issues that matter to us. Factions are fundamentally antagonistic in nature, but it's no wonder they are inevitable. Individuals are drawn to people who share their values, perspectives and priorities. As Smith remarks in the The Theory of Moral Sentiments, “a philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of a club to his own little knot of companions.” (TMS I.ii.2.6) We want people to understand us and our interests, and we want people who we can relate to without having to make adjustments to our disposition, our conduct, or what we are feeling about a particular topic. We want a concordance of sentiments.
The perspective that both this line in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the discussion of factions that Ryan refers to in his talk (WN V.i.g.7) seems to be the best-case scenario. The philosophers are harmlessly debating, discussing and disagreeing with one another. The Methodists, according to Ryan, challenging internally the authority of the church allow for a process of renewal and transformation. Factions serves to move things forward based on the sentiments and affections of the present moment and actually allow for the continued existence and stability of the institution of which they are a part. This is true in the ecclesiastical context of the church, but one can also imagine parties contending for political power.
There's a much darker side to the story also to be found in Smith's writings, which is absent from the discussion which Ryan has provided us with, and which is found right in Smith's first book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments—in part three of that work.
Smith writes, in a discussion on duty and the nation, that “the animosity of hostile factions, whether civil or ecclesiastical, is often still more furious than that of hostile nations and their conduct towards one another is still more atrocious.” (TMS III.3.43)
If you thought wars between countries could get bad, wars within countries can get even worse. Not only does this make for bad politics—brutal politics, even, (linger on that word ,"atrocious," for a moment)—but it makes us bad people. Smith goes on to say that “of all the corruptors of moral sentiments, therefore faction and fanaticism have always been by far the greatest.” (TMS III.3.43)
The fact that factions and fanaticism always have been the greatest corruptors of our moral sentiments points to the notion of inevitability. They're a part of the political life Smith finds himself in, and historically what he can observe.
Smith does not deny that there are other sources of our corruption.
As Ryan mentioned, the admiration that we give to the rich and powerful can also serve to corrupt our moral sentiments. But Smith draws our attention to faction and fanaticism as "by far the greatest." Although this claim is found in Smith's work of moral philosophy, following the argument Ryan has just put forward concerning the cohesion of Smith's work in general, they are likewise found in his political theory.
Factions and fanaticism, which start out as an innocuous desire for understanding, serve to draw us further apart and create conditions that limit our ability to sympathetically engage with one another. This, I argue, is a more fundamental fact of politics than the admiration we have for the rich and powerful.
The stakes become even clearer when we turn to the Wealth of Nations. Smith begins his discussion of factions in that work by quoting (and Ryan observed this), four full paragraphs from book three of David Hume's History of England . It's the passages immediately before this section in [Smith's] Article III on religious establishment, to which Ryan has devoted a considerable amount of his time.
It's in these sections of the History where Smith, using Hume's voice, is seen grappling with the question of religious and political authority, and, as the last line he quotes from Hume alludes to, that tension might not be as dark as it appears, since the ecclesiastical establishments prove in the end advantageous to the political interests of society. In fact, the case Ryan gives us claims it’s not that stark at all, and the church and state can peacefully coexist where factions are merely a part of their development. This portrays in my mind an overly optimistic narrative, where diverse perspectives in institutions or society more broadly are something we should always approve of. It is also clear that there are moral consequences of such groups for in our ability to be good, but further that there is a substantive political problem which they can pose. For this, I turn our attention to the end of the Wealth of Nations.
This is where Smith considers the case of Great Britain and Ireland. He writes that one of the strongest arguments for continued union between the two countries is that it would “at least, deliver them from those rancorouss and virulent factions which are inseparable from small democracies, and which have so frequently divided the affections of their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form so nearly democratical.” (WN V.iii.90) Here again, we hear about this problem of inevitability. If you have a small democracy, you are going to have factions. That's just how it is. There is, however, also a distinctly moral language at play here in Smith's use of the term affection, because Smith tells us in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that affection is “in reality, nothing but habitual sympathy.” (TMS VI.ii.I.7) We spend time together, we get to know one another, we become close. We spend time together, we get to know one another, we become close. And this is the problem that factions pose for us: in separating and dividing that affection.
Smith goes on in these passages to talk about the benefit of distance for citizens when they are away from the political capital of a country. And here he writes how this distance serves to render "them more indifferent and impartial spectators of the conduct of all.” (WN V.iii.90 This is one of the rare invocations in the Wealth of Nations of the impartial spectator, another considerable moral term that Smith uses. That he designs an entire system of moral philosophy around in his first work should point to the gravity of it. Smith's point here is that if you want to be a good person, get as far away from Parliament as possible, have your capital where you are nowhere near it. Finally, Smith remarks that “In the case of a total separation from Great Britain, those factions would be ten times more virulent than ever.” (WN V.iii.90)
This draws our attention to the stakes at play here and just how bad Smith thinks things could get. This is not just a case of immediate historical or political significance in his own time, but rather contributes more broadly to our understanding of his overall political theory. Factions may play a part in a process of renewal, but what about the situations where they don't and society is left scrambling to hold itself together?
To understand what constitutes a dangerous faction, we can turn to Smith's good friend David Hume. Hume writes in ”Of the Coalition of Parties” that “the only dangerous parties”, and here I'll use parties and factions interchangeably “are such as entertain opposite views with regard to the essentials of government, the succession of the crown, or the more considerable privileges belonging to several members of the Constitution.” The problem of factions seems arise when factions undermine the systems of which they are a part, and this relates to the concern (which Ryan has rightly identified) that Smith has about the stability of institutions over time and of public life more generally. But the stability of those institutions may be undermined by the very groups that Ryan associates with the potential for restoration.
What is it that makes these factions so persuasive? Part of the puzzle is the effect of party leaders. As the pictures Ryan has shown throughout his talk show, leaders can serve as a guiding force for how others engage and interact with one another, both putting them to sleep and causing them to be crazy. We are persuaded by powerful rhetoric, and this is why Smith warns his readers of “the poison of enthusiasm and superstition,” (WN V.i.g.14) which is one of the ways party leaders engage in the sentiments of their followers. Factions both are created and thrive during times of public discontent and disorder, and motivate their leaders towards a public spirit of system. But even in times of seeming peace and tranquility people still have cause for complaint, and disagreement never goes away. We are passionate people after all.
Ryan is right to say that within Smith there is a tendency to admire the rich and powerful, those who can inspire us with awe and those who we are inclined to follow. However, there’s a much more human explanation for the appeal of faction and one we also find in Smith. Factions provide a space for people to mutually sympathize with one another, and especially at times of significant stress or disorder, factions serve to promote a heightening of passions regardless of what the motivations for those passions are. This not only allows for individuals to feel proper and justified and approved of in their unmoderated passions, but able to share in those unmoderated passions with other people.
It is factions, I argue, which are the inevitable fact of politics, which corrupt our moral sentiments, undermining institutions and governments, but also our very ability to be virtuous. When they become dangerous or how they serve to threaten the peace and tranquility of society rather than improve upon it is a challenge, I leave open for discussion.
Ryan has drawn our attention to the way that stability is an essential part of Smith’s political theory. Factions, I have sought to argue, can serve to undermine that very commitment to stability. What makes factions so appealing and so enduring is the way they’re formed from our very desire for understanding, one we all know and share in. Smith tells us that we naturally desire not only to be loved but to be lovely, but where do we find that approval and how far are we willing to go for it? Thank you.
Want to read more?
Shal Marriot: People - Not Pieces in a Politician's Plan
Ryan Griffiths: Adam Smith's 'Coarse Clay' Political Realism
William Glod: Smith and Individualism
Janet Bufton: Of Jerks and Justice
Max Skjönsberg: Adam Smith on Political Parties
Steven Horwitz: Spontaneous Order in Adam Smith
Sabine El-Chidiac: Smith, Hume, and the Factionalist Fray
Shannon FitzGerald: Resisting the Corruption of Fanaticism
Online Library of Liberty Collection: Spontaneous Order